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Engineering Perfect Offspring: Devaluing
Children and Childhood
By WENDY ANTON FITZGERALD*
American law permits withholding otherwise life-saving medical
treatment from newborn children who are seriously ill or disabled when
treatment is virtually "futile" or "inhumane" in prolonging the child's life.,
Hence, when newborn children's genetic or congenital abnormalities would
so impair them, or their lives would be so fleeting in all events, parents and
physicians may legally choose the child's likely near-term death over life-
prolonging treatment.2 When exercising this choice, parents and physicians
estimate the degree of impairment and likely duration of an abnormal
child's life They can abide by the law, though, only by comparing these
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American Family Law, Laval University, Quebec City, Canada, where I presented an earlier ver-
sion of this Essay; the organizers of the 1997 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly's 24th An-
nual Symposium where I presented this Essay; Steven B. Anderson, Executive Editor of the Hast-
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1. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-02,
5106a(b)(2)(B), 5106g(6) (West Supp. 1997). The Act requires states to respond to reports of
"medical neglect," "including instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment from dis-
abled infants with life-threatening conditions" but "the term 'withholding of medically indicated
treatment' ... does not include the failure to provide treatment... to an infant when... (B) the
provision of such treatment would... (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the
infant's life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of survival of the infant
and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane." 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106g(6).
2. For this interpretation of the effect of the federal legislation, see, for example, Bowen v.
American Hosp. Ass'n., 476 U.S. 610 (1986); Steven R. Smith, Disabled Newborns and the fed-
era[ Child Abuse Amendments: Tenuous Protection, 37 HASTINGS L.. 765, 822 (1986); Devel-
opments in the Law-Medical Technology and 7he Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1584-614
(1990) [hereinafterDevelopments in the Law].
3. See Developments in the Law, supra note 2.
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estimates with an unarticulated standard. That is, when we ask whether a
child's life experience will be too inhumane or too short, we must compare
that child with someone else: Too inhumane or too short compared with
whose life experience? Will this child never see, hear, speak, or move as
you or I do? Will this child suffer and die before reaching maturity as you
or I have not? To whom, if anyone, should we compare seriously ill or dis-
abled newborn children? The legal standards, not formally articulated,4 beg
the question, what sort of a life is worth living?
Of course, the answer to that question depends on your perspective.
Different people using different points of comparison and different per-
spectives will answer differently. Parents who are themselves seriously ill
or disabled or experienced with some other adversity may view their chil-
dren's struggles differently from those parents who are not. Likewise, re-
ligious convictions will inform the perspectives of some parents. By de-
clining to articulate standards, the law permits different parents to choose
differently, at least for those newborn children for whom life-prolonging
medical treatment is "inhumane" or "virtually futile.",5 I would not suggest
that the law now remove from parents the authority to withhold inhumane
or virtually futile medical treatment from their children. Still, the expecta-
tions and standards which inform parents' decisions should concern us all.
In particular, our jurisprudence and legal culture instill in parents the
expectation and aim that children learn, mature, and grow to become self-
sufficient, independent adults. American liberties and our related market
economy both rely on this expectation that we all function sooner or later
4. The federal legislation requires states to adopt protocols for response to the withholding
of medical treatment from disabled newborns as possible medical neglect penalized under the
states' child abuse and neglect laws. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106g(10) (1988). The criteria for deter-
mining medical neglect remain as vague as they were prior to the enactment of the federal legisla-
tion, then, in order to accomodate parental and physician discretion in hard cases. See Nelson
Luid, Infanticide, Physicians, and the Law: The "Baby Doe" Amendments to the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 11 AM. J.L. & MED; 1, 27-28 (1985). Because "there is no real
national consensus on the underlying moral questions," Congress has not articulated legal stan-
dards which provide answers in the more complex-and more numerous--cases requiring parents
and physicians to decide whether to terminate treatment or to prolong a disabled child's life. Id.
Commentators have observed that the continuing vagueness of the legal standards effectively
authorizes parents to choose nontreatment of disabled newborn children who, with treatment,
would in fact survive. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Two Puzzles, 1984 ARIz. ST. L.J. 667, 668-
71 (1984). The "law in action" as parents choose not to treat disabled newborn children thus di-
verges radically from "the law on the books" defining such nontreatment as medical neglect. See
id. at 668.
5. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-02, 5106a(b)(2)(B), 5106g(6). The overarching purpose of
this federal legislation is, however, to ensure that all other seriously ill or disabled newborn chil-
dren do receive life-prolonging medical treatment, regardless of their parents' or physicians' ob-
jections. See Lund, supra note 4, at 21-24 (describing the legislative history and its purpose of
assuring the provisions of life-prolonging treatment to disabled newborn children).
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as individual, autonomous adults.6 Indeed, the recognition that their seri-
ously ill or disabled children-children with Down's syndrome, spina bi-
6. I anticipate that my characterization of the expectations of both our jurisprudence and
our related market economy are readily recognizable. Following is a brief summation of the basis
of my characterization:
As John Rawls has explicated in his comprehensive analysis of American constitutional jus-
tice, we comprehend legal personhood as the autonomous individual. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JusrIcE 142-50, 433-46, 513-20 (1971). That individual enjoys liberties of choice and, when
exercising those liberties rationally, remains free of interference from either government or from
private individuals. Hence, autonomous individuals act "from principles that we would consent to
as free and equal rational beings," including fewdom from the primary influence of "tradition and
authority, or the opinions of others." Id. at 516. Constitutional precedent, in turn, reflects this
legal understanding of personhood as autonomous individuality. Indeed, in landmark cases de-
fining the legal import of childhood, the Supreme Court has consistently referred to the aim of
childhood as producing the autonomous adult individual, an individual who enjoys both liberties
to choose rationally and the autonomy of economic self-sufficiency. Hence, in Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982), the Court examined children's access to public school education with heightened
scrutiny, see id. at 230, because education is a necessary predicate for competing in the economic
marketplace and attaining economic autonomy, see id. at 223. Education is also a necessary
predicate, the Plyler Court observed, for rationally exercising the liberty of enfianchisement. Id.
at 222. Likewise, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court analyzed the parental
right to keep older children out of public school through reference to the children's eventual abil-
ity to become law-abiding adults capable of economic self-sufficiency. Id. at 221. In particular,
the Court required assurance that the children removed from public schools would become, none-
theless, autonomous adults capable of relying on themselves rather than upon the state for eco-
nomic support. See id. Our jurisprudence thus embodies a model of legal personhood character-
ized by individual autonomy, a model interpreted in the context of childhood as the potential for
becoming economically self-sufficient and rationally independent adults. For further analysis and
substantiation of this predominant jurisprudence of childhood, see Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Ma-
turity, Difference, andMystery: Children's Perspective and the Law, 36 ARmz L. REv. 11, 22-33
(1994) (analyzing constitutional precedent); id at 41-45 (analyzing child support law); id. at 64-
71 (analyzing child custody law); id at 84-99 (summarizing the jurisprudential model of children
as potential autonomous, self-sufficient adults).
In turn, our cultural understanding of the import of childhood reflects this jurisprudential
model of adult autonomy and self-sufficiency. As a society, we aspire for our children to become
independent adults, both self-supporting and rationally choosing once vested with adult liberties.
We understand education, then, as crucial to our children's eventual ability to compete and suc-
ceed in a technologically sophisticated labor market. Moreover, we characterize children as in-
heriting individual and political power as adults and therefore rationalize investment in children as
investment in the responsible adult leadership of society's future. Indeed, legal autonomy, indi-
viduality, and economic self-sufficiency serve as the fundamental legal predicates for our capital
market economy. Our economic system relies on the liberty of market participants to choose ra-
tionally in their own self-interest and consequently to enjoy the financial reward of meritorious
choices or to suffer the financial penalties of individual failure. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 4th ed. (1992) (describing the manifestation in American juris-
prudence-in constitutional and business law and in the American common law of property, con-
tracts, family law, torts, and criminal law--of capital market economic principles and assump-
tions). Understanding economic dependence as the failure of the autonomous individual, then, our
law provides no right to support from private individuals or from the state in dependent people,
even children. We know, for example, from the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U.S. 587, 597 (1987), that children weild no vested right to support from their parents, for
child support laws derive only from mutable legislative will. Nor, of course, do children or other
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fida, or AIDS, for example-will face an often hostile society unprepared
to accomodate their needs burdens parents' medical decision making. Not
surprisingly, then, parents strive to birth and raise "perfect" offspring, chil-
dren who will become independent adults, able to compete and excel in
educational and, finally, commercial markets. No one can deny the utility
of such goals for children. I suggest, however, that the goals of adult inde-
pendence and self-sufficiency reflect an invidiously narrow perspective.
From this perspective, life is worth living because of adult autonomy, and
childhood is worth living as preparation for autonomous adulthood. This
equation leaves no room for seriously ill or disabled newborn children who
have little or no prospect of attaining self-sufficient adulthood.
In this essay, I observe that decision making about the medical treat-
ment of children, whether or not to prolong their lives, reflects our cultural
views on what sort of life is worth living. Our law and jurisprudence shape
these views by valuing pre-eminently independence and self-sufficiency,
7
attributes which seriously ill or disabled children do not enjoy. Of course,
no child enjoys independence or self-sufficiency. Moreover, even the most
"perfect" child with the best prospects for adulthood may meet an untimely
death. Our law and jurisprudence seem bereft, however, of principles and
perspectives capable of assuring that we value children, dependent as they
are, even if they do not survive to autonomous adulthood. I hope that a
critical examination of decision making for seriously ill or disabled chil-
dren can help legal practitioners and scholars begin to articulate a more in-
clusive legal understanding of what sort of life is worth living. Indeed, I
hope we can develop a legal perspective that values children and childhood,
however short-lived or imperfect, without reference to our hopes for adult-
hood.
I begin that undertaking here, first by describing the legal context of
medical decision making for genetically or congenitally abnormal children.
dependent people weild any right to support from the state as both the Gilfiard Court, id. at 596,
and the Court in Deshaney v. Winnebago Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 202
(1989), have observed. The parents of seriously ill or disabled newborn children, therefore, con-
front the prospect of raising children who will likely never conform to the expectations and stan-
dards of either the jurisprudential model ofpersonhood or the economic system premised on that
model.
Other critics before me have convincingly criticized the exclusivity of the jurisprudential
model of personhood, the autonomous individual, and the consequences of their exclusion to
women, people of color, and other people legally marginalized or left "outside" the predominant
jurisprudential model. For discussion of such critics, see, for example, Fitzgerald, supra, at 18-
19, 21, 24-25, 87-88, 91-98. In this essay, I seek to draw from the experience of medical treat-
ment decision making for seriously ill or disabled children in order to fuirther criticize that model
and to urge its expansion to include dependent people, including children, however "able" or not
they are.
7. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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I suggest that the formal and practical law guiding these decisions reflects a
devaluation of all children in our legal understanding of personhood. Sec-
ond, I recount three cases of conjoined twins, including two cases of par-
ents authorizing surgical separation of the twins with the hope of attaining
for the children a more "normal" (or perfect) future. I see in these twins, as
in other genetically and congenitally abnormal children, not so much physi-
cal defect and human tragedy as different, instructive, and often wonderful
ways of being human. Third, I describe recent advances in genetic research
and gene therapy and their popular reception. These advances coincide
with a politically resurgent social Darwinism and confront us urgently with
the question of whether to regulate, through law, individuals' options for
genetically engineering their children. From these discussions I conclude
that, culturally, socially, and legally, we promote an exclusive standard of
perfection for our offspring which undermines tolerance for human differ-
ence and devalues all children.
L The Legal and Jurisprudential Context of Medical Decision
Making for Genetically and Congenitally Abnormal Children
The treatment of seriously ill or disabled newborn children has long
challenged their parents and policy makers with deciding what it means to
be human.8 Assessing the likely duration and quality of the child's life, as
well as the burdens associated with caring for the child, parents and physi-
cians have withheld otherwise life-saving medical treatment from children
with pronounced genetic or congenital abnormalities.9 In the United States,
for over a decade, federal statutes and case law have formally prohibited
withholding medical treatment from abnormal children unless the treatment
would be virtually futile or inhumane in significantly prolonging the child's
life.10 Nonetheless, as commentators have observed, parents and physicians
yet quietly withhold otherwise life-saving medical treatment from many
other seriously ill or disabled newborn children, permitting them to die
8. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 4, at 16 nn. 68-69 & 73 (discussing "quality of life" criteria
for medical treatment decisions for seriously ill or disabled newborn children, including some
commentators' characterizations of such children as sub-human); Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagno-
ses andDiscrimination: Discriminatory Nontreatment of Infants with HlIVnfectio'n, 93 COLUM.
L. Rev. 1581, 1622-25 (1993) (discussing "sanctity of life" versus "quality of life' criteria for
medical treatment decisions for seriously ill or disabled newborn children).
9. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 8, at 1581-87; Martha A. Field, Killing "The Randi-
capped"-Before and,4fler Birth, 16 HARv. WOMEN's L. 79, 82 (1993); Smith, supra note 2, at
822-23.
10. See generally, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-02, 5106a(b)(2)(B), 5106g(6) (West Supp. 1997);
Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n., 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
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immediately." For these parents and physicians, the children permitted to
die would not have had a life worth living.
The substantive distinctions drawn for seriously ill and disabled chil-
dren, though, remain elusive. For many decision makers, the unarticulated
standard for comparison is a "normal" child, a child unimpaired and ex-
pected to survive through normal adulthood. Once we articulate this
standard for comparison, we can recognize medical decision making about
seriously ill or disabled children as measurements of deviation from a
norm. For many parents and physicians determining an abnormal child's
treatment, the issue is whether the child's impairment is so different from a
norm as to make the child's life, however long, not quite human, or at least
not worth living. I would suggest instead that seriously ill or disabled chil-
dren confront us with varieties of human difference, 13 compelling us to re-
think our tolerance for difference.
Among the myriad problems besetting children, medical decision
making for seriously ill or disabled children does not loom so large as child
poverty, abuse, racism, sexism, and other societal neglect.14 That we adults
collectively countenance such mass maltreatment and neglect of children
reflects, I believe, social, cultural, and moral devaluing of children as peo-
ple. In turn, the law reflects the small value adults as a powerfu.l collective
attach to children. As other scholars have explicated, American law, for
example, posits children as almost a species of parental property, subject-
ing them to their parents' plenary authority, for good or ill.15 The state may
intrude on parental authority for a sufficiently important state interest, but
11. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 8, at 1581-87; Field, supra note 9, at 83-84; Mnookin,
supra note 4, at 670.
12. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 8, at 1623-26; Lund, supra note 4, at 15-19.
13. My discussion of difference relies on Martha Minow's analysis in her MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW, 299-310 (1990). See also Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10,
13-18 (1987) (explaining how legal decision makers mistake their own subjective perspective for
objective, neutral norms, and arguing that all human "difference" is not innate, but rather deter-
mined from a particular perspective).
14. For a comprehensive description of the plight of children in the United States see, for
example, CHaDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN: 1997 YEARBOOK 9
(1997) (indicating that some 15 million American children live in poverty, with another million
predicted to join them as welfare program reforms are implemented). Child abuse and neglect
case numbers have risen, with approximately a million children confirmed abused or neglected
annually. See id. at 51. The gap between white students and students of color in academic
achievement has steadily widened since 1990, a gap which reflects the de facto racial and eco-
nomic segregation in schools. See id at 74-75.
15. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992) (demonstrating through analysis of
landmark Supreme Court precedents that parents' constitutional rights protect not so much diverse
parenting choices as parents' proprietary interests in children).
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-not in the interests of any particular child as a person.1 6 From the state's-
or adult collective's-point of view, the most important interest in children
is utilitarian or self-serving. The state should ameliorate child crime or il-
literacy or malnutrition, for example, in order to secure the safety, self-
sufficiency, and health of the adult population.' From this perspective,
childhood is crucial preparation for adulthood, but not especially valuable
in and of itself. As a society, we invest in, nurture, and educate children so
that they may become productive, self-sufficient adults.' 8 Children are the
future, as people are wont to say, comprehensively defining the social,
cultural, and legal value of childhood. Under our law, then, children are
potential adults.
Seriously ill and disabled children confound this legal paradigm, of
course, when they are unlikely to become self-sufficient, independent
adults even if they survive to adulthood. These abnormal children deviate
not only from the standard of the normal child, but also from the standard
of children-as-potential-adults now animating American law. Indeed, seri-
ously ill and disabled children differ mainly from normal children in that,
unlike normal children, they will not become self-sufficient, independent
adults.
Medically abnormal children require unusual financial investment and
care giving, but in this regard they differ from other children only in de-
gree. All children require substantial financial investment and care giving,
as every parent and most state child services programs bear witness. Most
children attain independence and economic self-sufficiency, though, upon
emancipation into adulthood. 19 Seriously ill and disabled children chal-
16. See, e.g., Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Warren and Burger Courts on State, Parent, and
Child Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HASTINGS
L.J. 461, 493-94 (1985) (discussing how parental rights limit state authority and interests); Fitz-
gerald, supra note 6, at 41-45, 64-71.
17. See e.g., Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Chil-
dren's Rights, 9 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 6 (1986) (discussing collective adult self-interest driv-
ing the legal treatment of children); Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 31-34 (arguing that adult utilitar-
ian aims comprise the driving rationales for Supreme Court decisions regarding children's
education); id. at 41-50 (discussing child support law); id. at 64-71 (discussing child custody
law); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws: On Child Heroism andAdult Power in
Juvenile Justice, 1996 WISC. L. REV. 495, 514-17, 521-23 (arguing that adult utilitarian aims
drive juvenile justice reforms).
18. See supra note 6.
19. I would note that economic self-sufficiency in the United States actually entails intricate
economic interdependence, necessary for survival, but rarely acknowledged. See William H.
Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (1986).
Moreover, as Michael Sandel has observed, the predominant jurisprudential model of legal per-
sonhood, the autonomous individual, fails to comprehend a broad range of human interdepend-
ence, not only economic, but also informing people's very identity. See MICHAEL . SANDEL,
LmERALiSM AND ThE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 175-83 (1982).
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lenging medical decision making, however, present little prospect for at-
taining either independence or adulthood. Our law may therefore encour-
age parents and physicians to devalue the lives of seriously ill and disabled
children and withhold life-prolonging treatment, not so much because the
care is costly and care-giver intensive, but because these children will never
become independent and hence legally valued adults.
If so, then the dilemmas of seriously ill and disabled children offer an
important insight into the maltreatment and neglect of children generally.
Culturally, socially, and legally, we define being human as independent,
self-sufficient adulthood. In jurisprudential terms characterizing American
law, for example, we value as human the "autonomous individual.' ,2° Chil-
dren are valuable as potential autonomous adults, and if they lack that po-
tenti'al, they may not seem legally valuable at all. Moreover, so long as le-
gal personhood hinges upon attainment of autonomous individuality, all
children are inferior, less-than-Iegal people. Hence American law, as
noted, consigns children to their parents' proprietary control, taking a pub-
lic interest in children only in order to assure their eventual development
into autonomous individual adults.
I have joined others in advocating the expansion of legal personhood
to include children and the attributes of childhood. Critics of American ju-
risprudence--feminists, critical race theorists, and others-have compre-
hensively detailed how an unspoken norm permeates the law, a norm dis-
tinct for its exclusivity in gender, class, race, and other human
differences.2' This narrow legal norm devalues as abnormal and inferior
different human characteristics, among them, I have argued, childhood.
Because children are dependent, immature, and not autonomous, they can-
not meet the legal norm and are thus relegated to inferior legal status for
the duration of childhood. Similarly, because seriously ill and disabled
children will, even if they attain adulthood, likely never meet the narrow
legal norm of individual autonomy, they may appear to parents and to phy-
sicians as forever relegated to an inferior legal status. Our law may thus
influence medical decision makers to withhold life-prolonging treatment
from abnormal children.
An attempt to comprehend children legally as children would help
subvert the exclusive legal norm of individual autonomy and gain legal
20. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 6.
21. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 19, at 175-83 (arguing that the model of the autonomous
individual in American law lacks the formative influences and relationships which, happily, shape
actual people and their choices). See generally PATRICIA I. WILLIAMS, TnE ALCHEMy OF RACE
AND RIGHTS (1991); Mar J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human
Nature: A Feminist Critique ofRawls' Theory ofJustice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986).
22. See Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 84-109.
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recognition for children's personhood.2 That is, let us value children for
themselves, not for their potential to become autonomous adults. Indeed,
what if most children never survived to adulthood? Their lives, however
short, dependent, and "childish" yet demand legal recognition and respect
as human.
Seriously ill and disabled children urgently confront us with this de-
mand. Many will not survive to adulthood, and yet their lives, however
short, dependent, and childish yet require legal recognition and respect.
Moreover, seriously ill and disabled children represent all children in this
imperative. If we cannot legally recognize and respect the personhood of
children bound to die, then we betray the morally unacceptable judgment
that no child is valuable except as a potential autonomous adult.
Unfortunately, American law, both formal and practical, does indeed
betray this morally unacceptable judgment. A widely-reported survey
showed, for example, that while fewer than a quarter of all children born to
IRV-infected mothers eventually manifest the virus, American doctors
would withhold otherwise life-saving medical treatment from some or all
such children, depending on the treatment.2 4 In response, the researchers
urged the usual treatment of all babies born to IV-infected mothers be-
cause the virus cannot be detected in children until several months after
birth.25 Embedded in both medical approaches is the assumption that, in
truth, we should not invest time, energy, and money into children who will
not survive childhood, if only we could reliably identify which ones they
were. Similarly, physicians now routinely counsel parents to abort fetuses
identified as genetically or congenitally "defective," noting that many chil-
dren with Down's syndrome, cystic fibrosis, or spina bifida rarely survive
very long into adulthood, and they require costly, difficult care for their
short lifetimes.26 All these short lives are not worth saving, apparently, be-
cause they are comprised almost entirely of childhood with little or no hope
of attaining autonomous adulthood. The law in practice informs parents,
children, and all of our culture that autonomous adulthood and not depend-
ent childhood, whether healthy or no, is the only recognized standard for
legal respect and inclusion in personhood.
23. See id; Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws: On Child Heroism and Adult Power in
Juvenile Justice, supra note 17, at 525-38.
24. See Betty Wolder Levin et al., The Treatment of Non-HIV-Related Conditions in New-
borns at Risk for hIV: A Survey of Neonatologists, 85 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1507, 1509-10
(1995).
25. See ia at 1512. Given recent medical advances resulting in an AIDS therapeutic drug
"cocktail" enhancing the prognosis of HIV-infected people and their unborn children, neonatolo-
gists might respond differently were the survey repeated today.
26. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 4, at 9-12.
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H. The Import of Recent Advances in Genetic Research and
Therapies
Parents and medical practitioners have withheld treatment of geneti-
cally and congenitally abnormal children for centuries,27 and infanticide is
still common in some cultures throughout the world.28 These practices
constitute a kind of crude genetic-engineering, a post-hoc method for "im-
proving" the human species by eliminating the least fit and preventing their
procreation.2 9 In the United States in the 1920s, political fervor for more
concerted eugenic practices resulted in the enactment in many states of
laws mandating the involuntary sterilization of "the feeble-minded" and
convicted criminals3 The Supreme Court struck down one such statute in
1942 as violative of Equal Protection,31 and a myriad of studies repudiated
the premise of a genetic cause of either mental retardation or criminality.
32
,Nonetheless, several states maintain statutory authority for involun-
tarily sterilizing the "feeble-minded," 33 and as recently as 1983 two states
authorized sterilizing epileptics.3 4 Popular enthusiasm for eugenic prac-
tices and the prevalence of underlying eugenic assumptions correspond, not
surprisingly, with periods of social turmoil and political intolerance.3 Our
age appears to be one of these periods, and coincides as well with unprece-
dented scientific research in human genetics. 6
Indeed, the past decade has witnessed enormous strides both in fun-
damental scientific understanding of human genetics and in therapeutic
technologies applying that new knowledge. The Human Genome Project,
an international co-ordinated endeavor to "map" human DNA, for example,
has located most of the genetic "markers" necessary for identifying human
chromosomes.3 7 International scientific efforts have located several single
gene diseases, including Huntington's disease and one form of breast can-
27. See id. at l.
28. See id. at I n.2.
29. See id. at I9-21.
30. See, e.g., IRAMARK ELLMAN AL, FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1023-36
(2d ed. 1991) (describing and discussing engenics law in the United States).
31. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
32. See, e.g., ELLMANETAL., supra note 30, at 1033.
33. Id. at 1034.
34. See id. at 1033.
35. See DOROTHY NEYEN & SUSAN LMDEE THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON, 126, 198-99 (1995).
36. See, e.g., id. at5-9,54-57.
37. See Laura Johannes, Detailed Map of the Genome Is Now Ready, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22,
1995, at B1.
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cer,a3 and at least two children have undergone first attempts to replace a
gene causing cystic fibrosis with normal human DNA 9 Precise mapping
of most genetic diseases, not to mention the design and proven efficacy of
gene therapies, remains in the future, however. Most diseases of known
genetic origin involve a complex set of genes, not just one, and safe, effi-
cient delivery systems of "normal" human DNA to human patients still
elude researchers" Moreover, while many diseases do not occur absent a
genetic propensity, most genetic diseases still seem to require environ-
mental catalysts of some kind to manifest themselves.41 Thus, not everyone
who carries a gene making them susceptible to cancer of the colon will de-
velop such cancer, for not every carrier will also suffer exposure to the un-
known environmental triggers necessary for the development of the dis-
ease. In sum, while genetic research and understanding accumulate at an
unprecedented pace, human genetics as a science and gene therapy as an
applied technology remain mostly unknown and untested.
4 2
In particular, the old debate about whether the influence of "nature" or
"nurture" predominates in people remains unresolved. Indeed, the best
educated guess informs us only that human organisms are complicated and
that the various influences of nature and nurture vary unquantifiably in the
most significant of human characteristics.! 3 In this context of profound ig-
norance, most geneticists report their incremental work with little popular
fanfare or publicized discussion of the social, ethical, and legal implica-
tions of human DNA researchM Some have attracted a mass audience,
however, with speculation regarding the genetic origins of obesity, alco-
holism, sexual orientation, and even the propensity for "risk-taking"' and
"shyness.'4,5 Moreover, some social scientists have re-popularized long
38. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins, Identification of Disease Genes: Recent Successes, HosP.
PRAc., Oct. 15, 1991, at 93; Mary.Claire King, Localization of the Early-Onset Breast Cancer
Gene, HOsP. PRAC., Oct. 15, 1991, at 12.
39. See Johannes, supra note 37.
40. See idL
41. See id
42. See NELIKEN & LINDEF, supra note 35, at 2-18.
43. See id at5-11, 195-97.
44. Note that funding for the international Human Genome Project includes academicians
examining the "Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications" or 'ELSr' of human DNA research, but
their work seldom receives notice beyond scientific and medical specialty publications. See, e.g.,
Nancy S. Wexler, Disease Gene Identification: Ethical Considerations, HOSP. PRAC., Oct. 15,
1991, at 145.
45. See NuxcEN& LINDm, supra note 35, at 93, 145 (regarding obesity); id. at 91-94, 100,
161-62 (regarding alcoholism); id at 159-168 (regarding risk-taking); id at 140-141 (regarding
shyness).
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discredited claims of the alleged genetic origin of such human behavior or
attributes as criminality and intelligence.
46
Western culture and politics, in turn, have seized on genetic deter-
minism, eager to understand a host of social ills as "naturally" dictated and
hence beyond any palliative of "nurture.'4 7 As Dorothy Nelkin and M. Su-
san Lindee have observed, this recent popular refocus on the supposed ge-
netic causes of individual and social problems arises less from any scien-
tific research itself than from the popular desire to explain such problems
genetically.48 Culturally, we attribute many more human problems and
characteristics to genetics than verified research warrants because we crave
these simple, clear, objective-seeming explanations of frustrating complex
behavior and issues.49
I see the recent rise of genetic determinism, indeed the renaissance of
social Darwinism, as a political phenomenon, absolving the privileged of
responsibility or guilt for social evils such as poverty, racism, and neglect.
5 °
Genetic determinism sanctions the consignment of an underclass--eco-
nomic, racial, and mostly urban-to its "naturally" or biologically "infe-
rior" fate, while the privileged withdraw to private "gated communities,"
indoor shopping centers, and elite schools.5 ' At the same time, as Profes-
sors Nelkin and Lindee observe, genetic determinism "medicalizes" soci-
ety, prompting us to ascribe human behaviors once seen as moral choices to
diseased DNA instead.52 Diseased or abnormal DNA is subject to no moral
46. See, generally RICHARD J. HERNTEn & CHARLES MURRAY, TiE BELL CURVE:
INmLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994); JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHAPDJ
L HER NSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985).
47. See NELKEN & LINDEE, supra note 35, at 41-49, 68, 101-126, 143-144, 149-168, 193-
199 (tracing .the rise of genetic determinism or "essentialism," as they call it, in contemporary
popular culture).
48. See id
49. See id
50. Popular social critics have recently published book-length studies concluding that
American poverty itself is genetic, resulting from an inferior genetic endowment for intelligence
and success in African-Americans, and not from racism or other social disadvantage. See e.g.,
HERRNSTE1N & MURRAY, supra note 46; see generally DINISH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM:
PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTICULTURAL. SOCIETY (1995). These authors therefore oppose programs
such as public assistance and affirmative action for perpetuating, they claim, genetic inferiority.
51. Escalating white, middle-class fear of crime, for example, prompts "flight' to secure,
exclusive, private domains inhabited by a largely white, economically privileged class, even
though white, middle-class fear of crime arises from race and class stereotypes, and not from a
realistic threat. See, e.g., JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNAN VERA, WHITE RACISM: THE BASICS 7,114-
24, 153 (1995); Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws: On Child Heroism andAdult Power in Ju-
venile Justice, supra note 17, at 499 (describing and substantiating white, middle-class fear of
crime victimization by impoverished children of color disproportionate to crime victimization sta-
tistics).
52. NELKEI & LINDE, supra note 35, at 194-95.
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force or social policy, of course. If ameliorable at all, diseased DNA is
subject only to medical or scientific therapies 3
Likewise, genetic determinism now permeates our popular and legal
views of conception, childbirth, and childrearing, medicalizing this realm
of human accomplishment and failure as well.54 Parenthood has become
for many a quest for genetic perfection, with the availability of pre-
conception genetic screening, "genius" sperm banks, prenatal testing, in-
trauterine therapies, and life or death decisions for "defective" newborn
children.-5 Elizabeth Bartholet has written that medical technologies and a
narcissistic obsession with perpetuating a particular genetic heritage un-
dermine our cultural and legal approval of adoptive and other nongenetic
family forms 6 I would add that our cultural embrace of genetic determin-
ism devalues all children and parenting by turning our focus to children's
genetic make-up and away from children as people profoundly influenced,
as we all are, by relationships with others.
The rhetoric of genetic defect and perfection, fueled by a medicalized
culture convinced of genetic determinism, conceals a growing intolerance
for human difference. Indeed, talk of genetic defect or perfection assumes
a singular norm, a physical stereotype or ideal. Like the jurisprudential
norm of individual autonomy, this genetic norm reflects only a particular,
privileged perspective. Culturally and legally, however, we accept this
perspective as objective and real because it seems to arise from empirical
science and not powerful bias5 We can therefore confidently, if mistak-
enly, define difference from the norm as inferiority, and now as genetic in-
feriority. From an adult perspective, all children are different (not autono-
mous), and hence legally inferior. Likewise, from the perspective of
human genetic normalcy, all difference is diseased or defective and thus is
subject only to therapeutic correction if subject to correction at all.
Even if we all agreed, though, on the benefit of correcting such genetic
conditions as Down's syndrome or cystic fibrosis-and we have no such
consensus now--could we also agree on the value or not of perpetuating
other genetic manifestations such as near-sightedness, obesity, or even, as
speculated, "risk-taking" and "shyness"? Of course, only speculation now
posits such human behaviors as criminality or attributes as intelligence to
53. See id
54. See id at 174-192.
55. Id.; see also Lund, supra note 4, at 19-21.
56. See ELIZABETH BARTHoLrT, FAMILY BONDs: ADOPfIoN AND THE PoLrIcs OF PAREN-
TING (1993); see also NEIKEN & LINDEE, supra note 35, at 58-78.
57. See MINOW, supra note 13, at 10, 13-18.
58. See NELXEN& LINDEE, supra note 35, at 41-49, 57, 198-199.
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genetic determinism, and these speculations will likely be discredited 9 In
the meantime, however, our political rhetoric and jurisprudence reflect both
this genetic determinism and the unstated assumption that deviance from
the genetic norm is not celebrated human diversity, but rather malignant de-
fect and disease. Since all children deviate from the accepted legal norm of
autonomous adulthood, I draw the analogy that dependent childhood is a
defect we "cure" as a society through nurture, education, and the passage of
time. Upon completing the cure and reaching adulthood, children attain
full legal recognition. Children who will not survive childhood, however,
never complete the cure and attain the autonomy entitling them to legal
personhood. If the analogy of childhood to defect or disease were inapt,
then our jurisprudence and legal culture would not countenance medical
decision making for seriously ill or disabled children only from the per-
spective of what these children might achieve in adulthood. When we con-
elude as a society, however, that children unable to survive childhood are
not worth saving or their lives worth living, we devalue childhood itself,
and all children with it.
H1. Human Difference and Interdependency: Conjoined Twins
Every year in the United States, some forty pairs of conjoined twins
are born, and most die, still joined, in early infancy.60 All conjoined twins
are "identical," sharing identical genetic compositions.6' Conventional
medical protocol dictates surgically separating conjoined twins if their
bodies can sustain each of them independently.62 Many twins share limbs
or vital organs, however, requiring that surgeons choose just one twin to
receive the single heart or shared limb.63 Separation surgery thus often re-
sults in the death of one or both of the twins. In many cases, no medical
prognosis can reliably guide parents as to whether surgery will prolong one
or both twins' lives. While most conjoined twins die young, some survive
to adulthood, whether conjoined or surgically separated. Three celebrated
sets of conjoined twins lived in the first half of this century, for example,
all three of whom led long, full lives.64 Two of the pairs eventually married
other people.65
59. See iU at 2-18, 194-95.
60. See Claudia Wallis, The Most Intimate Bond, TIME, Mar. 25, 1996, at 60.
61. See id.
62. See id.; see also infra note 63.
63. Consider, for example, the case of the Lakeberg conjoined twins who shared a single
heart. See Josh Plaut, A Painful Separation: Moral Aspects of Surgery on Siamese Twins, 50
SCL WORLD, Nov. 5, 1993, at 7.
64. See Kenneth Miller, Together Forever, LIFE, Apr. 1996, at 44, 56.
65. See id.
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Advances in surgical methods and medical technologies-enabling the
reconstruction of organs, for example-now enhance the survival rates of
surgically separated twins. The majority of surviving twins do so sepa-
rated.66 Indeed, most parents and physicians assume that separation ena-
bling independent lives greatly benefits children born conjoined. Con-
joined twins are objects of public pity, and sometimes disgust.67 Few can
imagine spending a lifetime utterly dependent on another person, unable
even to move without that person's consent, and deprived constantly and
forever of privacy. Dr. W. Hardy Honduran, an innovator in the surgical
separation of conjoined twins, remarked, for example, "I've seen twins that
have been left together. They can't walk. They can't even sit up. And be-
cause they're always stuck face-to-face, they fight constantly." 63
On the other hand, conjoined twins, like other identical twins, may
enjoy paranormal communication and other special psychological and
emotional bonds.69 Studies confirm the phenomena of idiosyncratic lan-
guages between identical twins, consonance of emotions, and a preference
for each other's company.70 Identical twins appear able to experience such
intimate interdependencies despite their development, as is usual, of dispa-
rate personalities.71 Nonetheless, or perhaps because of identical twins'
unusual bonds, conventional psychological and educational wisdom dic-
tates separating identical twins as well as conjoined twins. Parents are ad-
vised to dress identical twins differently, enroll them in different school
classes and activities, and otherwise encourage their individualism.72
I discern in these attitudes toward both conjoined and identical twins
cultural hostility toward their interdependence and their connectedness,
both physical and otherwise. Intimately attached twins defy the cultural
and social norm of adult independence and self-sufficiency. If not inde-
pendent and self-sufficient, twins appear lacking and perhaps inferior com-
pared with the norm. Conjoined and identical twins seem permanently im-
paired from achieving the individual autonomy we understand as the
hallmark of legal personhood.73
66. See TWIS MAGAZnE, THE TWISHm SOURCEBOOK: YOUR GUIDE To UNDERSTAND-
ING MULTIPLES 74-75 (Nancy L. Segal et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE TWINSHIP SOURCE-
BOOK].
67. See id. at 75-76, 77-78 (reciting accounts of several conjoined twins, some surgically
separated finally, and some not).
68. Plaut, supra note 63, at 7.
69. See Miller, supra note 64, at55-56.
70. See, e.g., THETWINSHIP SOURCEBOOK, supra, note 66, at 181-82, 240-41; see also id. at
96-99 (regarding reports and studies of twin extrasensory perception).
71. Seeidat73-74.
72. See id at240-41,243-46,246-48,252-57,259-62.
73. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Because our legal understanding of personhood as autonomous now
excludes conjoined and most identical twins, their ives may illuminate a
path for expanding our jurisprudence the better to embrace human differ-
ences. In particular, such twins seem to personify human attributes of con-
nectedness and interdependence, of fluidity in identity, and of the value of
co-operation, identified by many feminist and other legal critics as now ex-
cluded from our legal understanding of personhood.7 4 Three recent cases
of conjoined twins who received international media attention help illus-
trate, I believe, this observation.
In December 1992, a prenatal ultrasound test revealed that Reitha
Lakeberg was carrying conjoined twins, two girls joined at the chest and
abdomen. 75 Ms. Lakeberg's obstetrician and husband advocated aborting
the twins, but Ms. Lakeberg insisted on continuing the pregnancy to term.!
6
When in June of 1993 the twins were delivered at Chicago's Loyola Hos-
pital, neonatologists determined that they shared a liver and a single mis-
shapen heart. 7 Only a mechanical ventilator sustained the twins, named
Angela and Amy.78 Dr. Jonathan Muraskas, the twins' attending physician
at Loyola, advised the Lakeberg parents against attempting surgical separa-
tion of Angela and Amy.79 Only the twin receiving the once-shared heart
would survive surgery, and, in his experience, only for a few months.80
Moreover, Dr. Muraskas predicted that both twins would die sooner rather
than later so long as they shared the heart.8' Dr. Muraskas and his col-
leagues at Loyola Hospital therefore urged the Lakeberg parents to provide
comfort care only and to permit Angela and Amy to die a "natural" and
imminent death.82 "We sort of pleaded with" the Lakeberg parents, Dr.
Muraskas said, "to take the babies off the ventilator" and let them die.
83
The Lakebergs determined to attempt surgical separation, however, in
order to give at least one of the girls a chance of longer survival.84 In
August, the Lakebergs and their baby daughters traveled to Philadelphia's
74. Leading feminist critiques include, for example, Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); Matsuda, supra note 21; Martha L. Fineman,
Challenging LI, ,EstablishingDifference: the Future ofFeminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L.
REV. 25 (1990).
75. See Plaut, supra note 63, at 7.
76. See id.
77. See Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See Anastasia Toufexis, The Ultimate Choice, TIME, Aug. 30, 1993 at 43, 44 [hereinaf-
ter Ultimate Choice].
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Children's Hospital where a team of surgeons experienced in separation of
conjoined twins had agreed to attempt the procedure. The surgeons chose
Angela, the physically stronger of the two, to receive the one heart, and
permitted Amy to die in surgery.s6 Amy did die immediately, of course, but
Angela survived the procedure.
8 7
Indeed, Angela survived ten months after the surgery and died unex-
pectedly only a few days shy of her first birthday.88 Residing in Children's
Hospital's Intensive Care Unit, Angela had steadily improved physically
post-surgery, learning gradually to breathe and eat without mechanical aid,
and requiring little pain medication as she improved.89 She was an affec-
tionate child who delighted her caregivers by blowing kisses to people,
laughing, and cuddling.90 She enjoyed splashing in the bath, watching the
"Aladdin" video, and sucking lollipops.91 Angela also learned to attract
attention from her nurses by pulling electronic monitors off her body.
92
Angela's full recovery seemed sufficiently likely for her doctors to predict
her discharge from the hospital during the summer of 1994.93 Without
warning, however, Angela developed respiratory illness, followed by a
blood vessel malfunction, causing her sudden, acute, and rapidly fatal ill-
ness.94 Angela died in June of 1994. 5
The public debate over the Lakeberg case centered on cost-benefit
analyses.9  In July of 1993, for example, Chicago's Loyola Hospital re-
fused Ms. Lakeberg's request to perform the surgical separation. 7  The
cost of the twins' surgical care would top a million dollars, the Hospital
said, while Dr. Muraskas estimated the chances of one twin surviving at
just one percent.98 Accounts variously reported that the Lakebergs either
had no medical insurance at all or that their insurance was inadequate.
99
Ultimately, Loyola Hospital refused to perform the separation. Philadel-
85. See id.; Stephen E. Lammers, Tragedies and Medical Choices, 110 CIJSTIAN
CENTURY 845, 845 (1993); Karen Pallarito, $1 Million Treatment for Siamese Twin Reignites
Cost Debate, MOD1EN HEALTHCAEZ Aug. 30, 1994, at 44.
86. See Ultimate Choice, supra note 84, at 44.
87. See id.
88. See Anatasia Toufexis, The Brief ife ofAngela Lakerg, TIME, June 27, 1994 at 61, 61
[hereinafterBriefLife].
89. See Id.
90. See BriefLife, supra note 88, at 62.
91. SeeMi
92. See id
93. See id at 61.
94. See idt at 62.
95. See id at61.
96. See Ultimate Choice, supra note 84, at 44; Pallarito, supra note 85, at 4.
97. See Plaut, supra note 63.
98. See Ultimate Choice, supra note 84, at 43; Palarito, supra note 85, at 4.
99. See Ultimate Choice, supra note 84, at 44; Pallarito, supra note 85, at 4.
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phia's Children's Hospital agreed to perform the surgery, and to cover the
costs with funds earmarked for charitable eases, asserting that the twin cho-
sen to receive the heart stood a good chance of recovery. 00
Physicians, health care policy makers, and medical ethicists roundly
criticized the Hospital's decision in the press. The comments of Erik Par-
ens, an ethicist at a New York think tank, were typical. "This case screams
out," he said, "for us to start thinking rationally about how we allocate re-
sources." ' 1 Not Children's Hospital, but all of society pays for such costly
care as the Lakeberg twins required. 02 We fear rationing health care re-
sources, Mr. Parens observed, "when, in fact, we're rationing all the
time."10 3 Arthur Caplan, Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at
the University of Minnesota, also decried the estimated million dollar ex-
pense.104 "There are kids with no tetanus shots, moms that have never been
to the doctor or who have just given birth and don't know how to feed their
babies, and no resources are pointing in those directions," he said. 0 5
Moreover, the Lakeberg father seemed particularly undeserving of charity
once press reports revealed Ken Lakeberg's violent criminal history and his
squandering of funds donated for the twins on fancy meals and drugs:
10 6
Seizing upon Dr. Muraskas' original estimate that, at best, one Lakeberg
child had no better than a one percent chance of survival, commentators
concluded the cost was too high for so little benefit.
0 7
To me, however, the Lakeberg case illustrated more the inherent ineq-
uities and contradictions of the United States health care "system" than any
genuine concern about resource allocation. Had the Lakebergs enjoyed ie-
cure private insurance sufficient for paying for the twins' care, or were the
Lakebergs independently wealthy, I doubt so many authorities would have
brazened the opinion that such private funds were misspent Moreover,
foregoing surgical separation would not, as a practical matter, have assured
any other American children tetanus shots, adequate nutrition, or prenatal
care. In fact, the Lakeberg case was not even unusual, for neonatology
units in American hospitals routinely administer million-dollar care to criti-
cally sick infants born with congenital defects. 08 In the cost-benefit analy-
sis of the Lakeberg case, then, commentators took greatest issue with the
100. See Pallarito, supra note 85, at 4.
101. Id.
102. See id
103. Id.
104. See Ultimate Choice, supra note 84, at 44.
105. Id.
106. See Sequels: Dad's Dues, PREOPLF, Dec. 27, 1993, at 123, 123.
107. See id.; see also LaImers, supra note 85, at 845.
108. See BriefLife, supra note 88, at 62.
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benefit, for they expected Angela to die."0 9 A million dollars in charity
should not have been spent, it seemed, to sustain the life of one child al-
most certain to die anyway in a matter of months."
0
As it turns out, however, Angela's grim prospects were no medical
certainty. Dr. Muraskas, the Loyola neonatologist who gave Angela only a
one percent chance of survival admitted a year later, once Angela had died,
that he had contrived those odds only "to try to make the family agree with
us" to remove life support from the twins upon their birth., Referring to
Mr. Lakeberg's illegal drug problems and the family's situation, Dr. Mu-
raskas stated, "You have to ask yourself if chain-smoking parents in a
trailer park is the most conducive environment for a sick child."'12 Dr. Mu-
raskas thus seemed to have anticipated that one of the twins would survive
hospitalization for ultimate discharge home. Indeed, Angela's surgeons in
Philadelphia concluded that she had better than a ninety-five percent
chance of survival after surgery.13  It appears, then, that the cost issue
raised so vehemently in the Lakeberg case was at least inappropriate.
Those commentators inveighing against the million-dollar cost of Angela's
care simply did not calculate a ninety-five percent chance of her leading a
healthy, "normal" post-life surgery."
4
The clamor over cost in the Lakeberg case obscured more fundamental
issues. The first question, it seems to me, is whether the Lakeberg twins
should have been separated at all, and, if so, why? Should the Lakeberg
twins have been separated for their own sake? Surgery and Amy's death
enabled Angela to survive long enough to learn to laugh." 5 Does the year
of life Angela gained justify the separation and Amy's death? Angela's
parents and her Philadelphia surgeons believed it did."6 Under different
circumstances, Angela could have survived to lead a "normal" life. Would
109. See id.; see also Pallarito, supra note 85, at 44.
110. See, e.g., Lammers, supra note 85, at 845.
111. BriefLife, supra note 88, at 62.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 61.
114. See id. Moreover, any system of socialized medicine would no doubt have cast the
Lakeberg case in a different light entirely. While medical costs are controlled and health care ef-
fectively rationed in a socialized system, such a system would not likely have singled out the
Lakebergs as a cause celebre in a debate over costs versus benefits. After all, the Lakeberg twins
werejust two ofimany thousands of critically ill newborn children challenging health care systems
with astronomical costs for their care. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Destructing Disability: Ra-
tioning of Healthcare and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
49, 49-50 (1996) (observing that every health care system rations health care because of relatively
unaffordable costs, and that the American system has historically rationed care by patients' ability
to pay the costs); id 74 n. 11I (observing that socialized health care systems in Canada and Brit-
ain ration through waiting lists).
115. See BriefLife, supranote 88, at 62.
116. Seekt
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those results have better justified the twins' separation and Amy's death?
If so, why? Are duration and normalcy the criteria for the value of human
life? In other words, does childhood become more valuable, more entitled
to legal regard, the closer it approximates independent or autonomous
adulthood? Had we known for certain that Angela would survive just a
year, would that year of childhood have justified the separation and Amy's
death?
A formal legal response to those questions is simply that the Lakeberg
parents had the right, indeed, a constitutional right, to decide whether to
separate the twins.1 7 Absent medical certainty regarding the girls' life ex-
pectancy, the Lakebergs wielded the legal right to determine their chil-
dren's medical treatment.118 That right was hollow, of course, so long as
the Lakebergs could not afford the twins' medical treatment. Incapable of
paying for the surgery themselves, the Lakebergs had no "right" to tap gov-
ernment assistance or private charity for aid,'19 as the many commentators
on their case emphasized.120 Had no other hospital come forward to pro-
vide the surgery without cost to the Lakebergs, then, the girls would have
died at Loyola Hospital as Dr. Muraskas predicted and urged.
Even had economic factors not undermined the Lakeberg parents'
right, however, their formal legal right fails to account for the personhood
of their twin baby girls. By distinguishing the parents' rights from the
twins' own legal recognition, I do not mean to question the propriety of the
Lakeberg parents' decision to separate the twins surgically. I have no
doubt from the published accounts that parental love motivated at least
Reitha Lakeberg's passionate fight to secure life-prolonging medical treat-
ment for at least one of her daughters. 2 Moreover, I recognize and affirm
that parental decision making encompasses a necessarily subjective calcu-
lus of the effects of a child's medical care on the child, on other family
members, and on the family as a whole. I seek, rather, to focus analytical
attention on the legal status of the twins themselves, distinguishing their
interests as people from -those of their parents or of the state, however be-
nevolent those adult interests may be. That analytical attention raises im-
portant questions, I believe, about the legal context in which the twins'
lives were publicly debated. Was the prolonged life of Angela with a
chance of surviving to adulthood more important, legally and morally, than
117. See generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERO, CHIlD, FAMILY AND
STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAw 590-627 (3d. ed. 1995).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Ultimate Choice, supra note 84, at 44 (quoting medical ethicists Erik Parens
and Arthur Caplan); Lammers, supra note 85, at 845.
121. See Ultimate Choice, supra note 84, at44.
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the life Angela and Amy shared, however briefly, conjoined? Are children
legally cognizable only to the extent their lives approximate the norm of
potential autonomous adulthood?
The case of Eilish and Katie Holton, a pair of Irish conjoined twins,
brings these questions into sharper focus. Born in 1988 to a Dublin couple,
Liam and Mary Holton, Eilish and Katie were joined at the chest and ab-
domen and shared just two legs between them.122 Unlike the Lakeberg
twins, the Holton girls had separate hearts, but they shared other major or-
gans. Nurtured in a loving home, the Holton twins grew to healthy, happy
three-year-olds. 12 They struggled to learn to walk as they were "top
heavy," but otherwise their development was in every way normal.124 Eil-
ish and Katie also developed different personalities, with Eilish more re-
served and shy and Katie more outgoing and playful. 12 The two girls were
obviously enamored of each other, sharing their responses and emotions as
well as most of one body.
126
Still, the Holton parents began to explore the possibility of surgically
separating Eilish and Katie. Numerous consultations with Irish and English
physicians failed to quantify the benefits or risks the twins faced in sur-
gery.12 On the one hand, only one or neither twin might survive surgery. 128
Further, assuring the girls physical independence would necessitate succes-
sive operations debilitating their childhoods and would also require the
permanent use of prosthetic devices to replace shared limbs.129 On the
other hand, Mary Holton worried over the girls' reception in public. Peo-
ple already stared rudely at the children during public outings, and Mary
Holton longed for peoples' "acceptance" of the conjoined twins.130 The
Holton parents also worried about the twins' physical limitations so long as
they were joined, hoping that separation would provide the girls greater
mobility, independence, and normalcy.1
31
Shortly after the girls' third birthday, the Holton parents authorized
their surgical separation.'3 2 . Prior to surgery, the Holtons tried to help pre-
pare the interdependent girls for separation. They showed dolls joined with
122. See 20/20: Divided by Love-The Story of Conjoined Twins, (ABC television broadcast,
Feb. 5, 1993) [hereinafter20/20: Divided by Love].
123. See iUl
124. Id
125. See id.
126. See id
127. See &E
128. See id.
129. See idL
130. See id.
131. See id
132. See ida
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velcro to the twins, and then pulled the dolls apart to demonstrate the girls'
future.133 Four days after the long operation, Katie died from a weak heart,
as an autopsy later showed.134 Doctors speculated that Eilish's stronger
heart had sustained both children, and that Katie's was too weak to support
a separated, independent twin. The Holtons comforted themselves with the
belief that, without the surgery, the physical demands on the two hearts,
one strong and one weak, might have eventually killed both girls.
135
Eilish, meanwhile, grieved for Katie.136 For a long time whenever
Eilish awoke, she immediately sadly searched her side where Katie once
always lay beside her.137 Eilish also kept up running conversations with the
absent Katie all day long.3 1 Her parents believe that Eilish's grief began to
subside as she seemed to absorb more of Katie's missing personality.
39
Like Katie, Eilish became more outgoing and spirited. 4 ° When three years
after Katie's death Eilish was fitted for a new prosthetic hip and leg, and
understanding the prosthesis was to augment part of her body, Eilish
promptly named the device "Katie.'
14
'
Hoping to attain a better life for both girls, the Holtons lost a daughter
and Eilish seems to have lost a part of herself. Another, more autonomous
individual might have thrilled to the liberty and independence of separation
from a conjoined twin. Those who understand their identities as continu-
ously informed by their relationships and experiences may feel more em-
pathetic with Eilish's grief. While American jurisprudence posits an
autonomous individual as the model for legal personhood, feminist legal
scholars have criticized this model as narrowly exclusive, devaluing people
who understand themselves in the context of their community, family, and
other human connections. 142 To the question of what course was "best" for
Eilish and Katie or for the Lakeberg twins, we can answer only subjec-
tively. We should apprehend, however, that the Holton parents' fears that
an intolerant society would reject the conjoined twins pr9mpted their sepa-
ration. In a different, better society, people would "accept," as Mary Hol-
ton termed it,143 the conjoined twins' congenital condition as another de-
133. See id
134. See id
135. See id.
136. See 20/20: Divided by Love, supra note 122.
137. See i
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., Law, supra note 74; Matsuda, supra note 21; Fineman, supra note 74; see also
SANDEI, supra note 19, at 175-83.
143. 20/20: Divided by Love, supra note 122.
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Iightful human difference in a diverse human population. Societal accep-
tance, tolerance, and even celebration of human difference, in turn, would
create a profoundly different context for parental decision making.
The Iolton twins' pediatrician, Dr. Patrick Deasy, observed before the
separation surgery, "I think the natural response when you see twins like
[the Holtons] is to see if they can be like the rest of us and therefore lead
separate existences." 144 Indeed, many people automatically assume that
different characteristics in others manifest inferiority, and genetic engi-
neering now looks to the day when therapies can right all abnormalities.' 45
"But equally," Dr. Deasy said, "one would have to consider whether sepa-
rating [the Holton twins] just for the sake of conforming to our ideas of
normality would, in fact; help them or kill them."146 Some parents may
seek to engineer their children genetically, repair congenital abnormalities,
or withhold life-prolonging treatment from a seriously ill or disabled child
because those parents sincerely believe in the rightness and validity of the
prevalent model of legal personhood, the autonomous individual. Other
parents may make the same decisions regarding their children's treatment,
not because they reject the child's abnormality, but because they fear for
the child's futuire in a legal, cultural, and social environment which deval-
ues and oppresses human difference. Whatever the motives, both sorts of
parental decisions to separate conjoined twins or otherwise engineer con-
formity for their children may eventually result in the eradication of seri-
ously ill and disabled children, the extinction of these forms of human dif-
ference.
Good riddance to human difference, we might reply, if it means the
eradication of severe physical disabilities and concomitant suffering. Let
us genetically engineer offspring and repair newborn children's abnormali-
ties to every possible extent the better to assure such children's quality of
life. How do we distinguish, though, the disabled from the differently
abled, the genetic or congenitally inferior from the diversity of the human
species?
On a visit to the United States in 1995 for a replacement prosthesis,
Eilish Holton visited the Hensel twins.147 Brittany and Abby Hensel were
born the same year as Eilish and Katie and, like them, were born joined at
the chest and abdomen.148 The Hensel parents, in consultation with their
daughters, have refused so far to separate Abby and Brittany surgically.
149
144. Id.
145. See NalKXEN & LINDEE, supra note 35, at 41-49, 68, 101-26, 143-44, 149-68, 193-99.
146. Id.
147. 20/20: Divided by Love, suprp note 122.
148. See id.
149. See id
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Their life together demonstrates, I think, that the distinction between dis-
ability and differently abled is often merely one of perspective.
At the time of Eilish Holton's visit the Hensel twins were six years
old, healthy, and like most children their age, very active. They each con-
trolled one arm and one leg, but had mastered co-ordinating so they could
walk, run, and ride their bike.15° To tie their shoes, count on their fingers,
or accomplish all the other myriad daily tasks requiring two hands, they
also co-ordinated and co-operated. 151 Like other identical twins, Abby and
Brittany had distinctly different personalities, one more aggressive and ex-
troverted, the other more diffident and pensive.152 They fought occasion-
ally, and Brittany once hit Abby in the head with a rock,15 3 as other fighting
siblings have done. When they disagreed, though, unlike other siblings,
Abby and Brittany became completely stymied, sometimes actually unable
to move.154 Moreover, when the Hensel parents disciplined one twin with
banishment to her room, the other twin was banished and punished too.
55
Perhaps as a consequence of this complete interdependence, Abby and
Brittany exemplified between them exceptionally effective communication,
unhesitating cooperation, and decision making by consensus. 156 At their
preschool, the Hensel twins had spontaneously led a discussion about chil-
dren fighting and how to avoid conflict. 5 7
Abby and Brittany Hensel are the antithesis of individual autonomy,
then, and indeed exhibit the qualities of co-operation and connectedness
often remarked upon in "female" culture.158 They are seriously abnormal,
and from some people's perspective, seriously disabled. They are undenia-
bly human, however. Further, no objective or empirical test could discern
that the Hensel twins are somehow inferior to normal children. For all the
physical skills they may lack, they demonstrate keen relationship skills that
most people never develop.15 9 Had the Hensel parents repaired the twins'
150. See Miller, supra note 64, at 56.
151. See idt
152. See id
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id
158. For a discussion of "female culture" generally, see, for example, Law, supra note 74,
Matsuda, supra note 21, and Fineman, supra note 74. See also SANDEL, supra note 19, at 175-
83.
159. Daniel Goleman argues in his celebrated book EMOTIONAL INLGENCE, for example,
that impulse control, persistence, zeal, empathy, social graciousness, discipline, altruism, and
compassion account more for success in both family relationships and in the work place than
more traditional indices such as I.Q. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE x-xiv
(1995). I would suggest that, unlike many children Goleman cites in his work, id. at x-xi, 231-34,
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congenital abnormality, neither the twins nor we could learn from, admire,
and celebrate their very different and profoundly intimate sisterhood. In a
more tolerant culture, one accepting of human difference and endowed with
a jurisprudence reflecting an ethos of inclusiveness, Abby and Brittany
could be appreciated as a wonderful variation on being human. Instead, in
a culture which devalues difference and a jurisprudence premised on-a nar-
row norm, the Hensel twins are disabled, inferior, and not quite human be-
cause they can never achieve autonomous individuality.160
IV. WhatDoWeDoNow?
It is not my purpose to judge morally the decisions of parents now
coping with genetically or congenitally abnormal children. As other com-
mentators have observed, in the United States, at least, many parents of
such children are bereft of financial aid and sustaining social services.161
Moreover, ours is a culture and society carelessly neglectful or openly hos-
tile to abnormal children and their families. 62 The cases of the conjoined
twins, for example, thus suggest no simple paradigm or prescription. Some
will affirm parents' decisions to separate their twins, while others will laud
parents' decisions to leave their twins conjoined. For my part, I am un-
willing to second-guess the anguished decisions of parents confronted with
critical and urgent choices profoundly shaping their children's and their
own lives. The glare of public attention casts the strengths and weaknesses
of each of these families into stark relief, prompting public approval or
condemnation of each choice. The parents of conjoined twins appear he-
roic or contemptuous by turns, and thus isolated and ineluctably different
from the rest of us. I would urge, however, that discussion of any geneti-
cally or congenitally abnormal children move beyond the moral judging of
their parents. Who knows what you or I would have chosen for our chil-
dren were we in the shoes of other, real parents?
Instead, I have proposed that we examine critically the legal culture
constructing each of these parents' choices and work toward a jurispru-
dence which will embrace all of human difference, genetic and congenital
included. American society lends itself, of course, to no facile analysis of
how our law informs our culture and vice versa. As lawyers, we can work
toward broadening our jurisprudence to include children, indeed all human
the Hensel twins have already learned through their interdependent relationship those attributes of
"emotional intelligence" that he hopes schools and families will strive to instill in children.
160. See supra text accompanying note 6.
161. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 8, at 1598-1605 (1993); Smith, supra note 2.
162. Recognizing pervasive discrimination against the disabled, the U.S. Congress enacted the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-213 (West Supp. 1997).
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difference, in our legal understanding of personhood, hoping thus to help
transform our culture to become more inclusive as well.
In the meantime, however, families urgently turn to us as lawyers for
help. What, for example, should we advise the parents of a child with
Down's syndrome when they are offered the option of plastic surgery trans-
forming their son's features the better to approximate the norm? 63 I want
to respond that, rather than changing the child, society must change to ac-
cept and value the child as he is. That response fails to recognize, though,
the heartache the whole family suffers as the child bears daily cruel taunts
and rejection. While I recognize that the law must prevent parents and
physicians from discriminating against children who are seriously ill or
disabled because of the illness or disability,164 I affirm nonetheless the laws
authorizing parents to make medical treatment decisions for their children
because, unlike the state's or physicians', parents' decisions are more likely
motivated by love for the children. Instead, I hope to focus the attention of
our law and jurisprudence on fostering an economic, legal, and cultural en-
vironment which values children for themselves, regardless of how their
abilities or disabilities may affect adulthood or adult society.
Another pressing example is the increasing psychiatric diagnosis and
treatment of "Gender Identity Disorder" in young children. 65 Mental
health professionals may diagnose this "disorder" when children's prefer-
ences for clothes, toys, and styles of play are "inappropriate" for their gen-
der.166 Professional and parental concern arises because of the social teas-
ing and rejection young boys, for example, face when they play with girl
dolls. 67 Hoping to spare children from social ostracizing, parents and pro-
fessionals employ therapies to reorient young children in conformity with
socially-accepted "gender identification."' 68 Could we not instead reorient
163. Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse posed this question to me at the International As-
sociation of Family Law North American Conference on Parent-Child Relationships in Quebec
City, Quebec, Canada, in June, 1996.
164. I agree, then, with the analyses of Mary Crossley, Of Diagnoses and Discrimination:
Discriminatory Nontreatment ofInfants with HMVInfection, 93 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1581 (1993),
and Nelson Lund, Infanticide, Physicians, and the Law: The "Baby Doe" Amendments to the
ChildAbuse Prevention and TreatmentAct, 11 AM. L L. & MED. 1 (1985).
165. See KENNETH J. ZUCKER& SUSAN . BRADLEY, GENDER IDENTITY AND PSYCHOSEXUAL
PROBLEMS IN CHwLDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 9, 11, 14 (1995) (diagnosis and treatment of the dis-
order can begin in preschool children).
166. See idt at 11, 15-16 (describing the disorder as manifested in children's choice of dress-
up clothes); id at 16-17 (describing the disorder as manifested in children's choice of toys); id. at
18-20 (describing the disorder as manifested in children's choice of play styles).
"167. See id. at 19-20, 266 (describing teasing, rejection, and ostracism from their peers re-
sulting in trauma to boy children who choose "girl" dress-up clothes, toys, and play styles and, to
a lesser extent, to girl children who choose "boy" dress-up clothes, toys, and play styles).
168. In their book GENDER IDENTITY AND PSYCHOSEXUAL PROBLEMS IN CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS, Drs. Kenneth . Zucker and Susan L Bradley describe therapy for gender identity
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society to accept and welcome children who defy gender stereotypes? It is
more probable that researchers will pursue genetic therapies to "cure' so-
cially unaccepted gender identification, as well as sexual orientation169 and
Down's syndrome.
Families and their lawyers who have fought on behalf of children di-
agnosed with Attention Deficit - Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") may
serve as a model for aiding children immediately in our current culture and
for hastening the transformation of our legal culture as well. ADHD is a
syndrome resulting in learning disabilities, including abnormal distractibil-
ity and impulsivity and, in some cases, hyperactivity as well. 70 Psychiatric
professionals estimate that some three and a half million American children
suffer from this disorder nationwide,171 and a comparable number of chil-
dren receive therapy. 72 Most children diagnosed with ADHD receive pre-
scribed doses of Ritalin or other powerful therapeutic drugs which help
most ADI-D children concentrate better in school and better control impul-
sivity.173 Because ADHD seems to run in families, some researchers an-
ticipate one day identifying a genetic cause of the disorder, perhaps curable
with other medical therapies. 174 For many parents and children, Ritalin and
other drug therapies have seemed to work miracles, enabling ADHD chil-
dren to meet the normal behavior and performance requirements of
disorder undertaken to reduce peer ostracism, see ia9 at 266, to treat "underlying psychopatholo-
gies," id. at 266-67, and to prevent adult transexuality, see id. at 267, as "obviously clinically
valid and consistent with the ethics of our time," id at 269. I would counter that the trauma for
these children seems to result more from an intolerant environment than from some inherent flaw
in them. The further observation of Drs. Zucker and Bradley that therapy undertaken to prevent
adult homosexuality, see id. at 267-69, is "considerably more problematic," id at 269-70, seems
like an understatement, to say the least.
169. See, e.g., NELKEN & LENDE , supra note 35, at 119-20 (describing and discussing
speculation that a genetic "cause" ofmale homosexuality has been discovered).
170. See, e.g., Claudia Wallis, Life in Overdrive, TIME, July 18, 1994, at 59, 60. When hy-
peractivity is absent, the syndrome is referred to as "Attention Deficit Disorder" or "ADD." Id
For a comprehensive discussion of ADHD and ADD, the state of medical knowledge of these
syndromes, their effects, and their treatments, authored by two Harvard Medical School psychia-
trists diagnosed with adult ADD themselves, see EDWARD M. HALLOWEIL & JOHN J. RATEY,
DRivENTODIsiRACTiON: ATrENfoNDIClTDIsORDERIIN CHIaDREN AND ADULTS (1994).
171. See Wallis, Life in Overdrive, supra note 170, at 43.
172. See, e.g., Diane Granat, The Young and the Restless, WASHINGTONIAN, April 1995, at
60, 61 (noting that, because of difficulties in diagnosis, not all children receiving therapeutic
medication have ADHD or ADD, and not all children with ADHD or ADD receive drug or any
other therapy).
173. See Wallis, supra note 170, at 48-49 (describing Ritalin therapies and controversies sur-
rounding Ritalin use); PAUL H. WENDER, THE HYPERACTIVE CHILD, ADOLESCENT, AND ADLT:
ATE NO DEFICrr DISORER THROUGH Ti LIFMPAN 59 (1987) (describing other drug thera-
pies).
174. See idL See also Wallis, supra note 170, at 46-47.
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school.175 Families and their lawyers, however, have also succeeded in us-
ing the Americans with Disabilities Acte76 to compel public schools to ac-
commodate the disabilities of ADHD children.
1 77
The diagnosis of ADHD, now the most frequent psychiatric diagnosis
in children, is properly controversial. 178 ADHD behavioral symptoms seem
common to all children in one degree or another.' 9 All children (and even
adults) struggle at times to concentrate in school. All children (and even
adults) experience transports of excitement or hnger triggering impulsive
conduct. I do not doubt that ADHD children experience struggles and im-
pulsivity more than the norm, with debilitating effects, and a genetic or
biological agent may well be the cause. I would query, again, however,
whether we ought to focus our efforts more on changing the child's envi-
ronment than on changing the child with medication or other medicalized
therapies. In response to families' insistence, often through lawsuits, pub-
lic schools are increasingly altering teaching methods to help ADHD chil-
dren.180 Teachers employ more "hands-on" learning opportunities for
ADHD children, for example, because ADHD children seem to learn more
easily when they can use all five senses."' Of course, most children learn
more easily, educators generally agree, from "hands-on" learning experi-
ences.18 2 Hence, school accommodations for ADHD children, legally com-
pelled, may help reform public schools to more child-oriented teaching
techniques of benefit to all children. Likewise, I suspect that curriculum
designed to help "mainstream" children with Down's syndrome by educat-
ing their teachers and classmates in tolerance, respect, and acceptance
benefits all the children and adults involved.
Perhaps educators and mental health professionals can better help
children typed with "Gender Identity Disorder" also by educating these
children's families, peers, and teachers to accept and welcome difference.
As lawyers and policy makers, we should not attempt to substitute our
judgment for that of the parents as they consider medicalized options for
helping their children to conform more nearly to the norm. We should be-
175. See, e.g., Wallis, supra note 170, at 49; Anna M. Thompson, Attention Deficit Hyperac-
tivity Disorder: A Parent's Perspective, PMHDELTAKAPPAN433, 434-35,437-38 (1996).
176. 42 U.S.CA, § 12101-213 (West Supp. 1997).
177. See e.g., Wallis, supra note 170, at 49-50.
178. See Granat, supra note 172.
179. See id. (noting that skeptics about AD-D observe correctly that most people, including
adults, experience behaviors used to diagnose ADHD in children).
180. See, e.g., Wallis, supra note 170, at 49-50.
181. See id.; Ruby L. Bailey, More Parents Turn to Schools to Teach Their Learning-
Disabled Children, THE DETROrr NEws, Sept. 10, 1996 at Cl, C5 (describing both private school
and public school programs for learning-disabled children, including ADHD children).
182. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 181 at C5; Wallis, supra note 170 at49-50.
come alert to opportunities, however, to use laws such as the Americans
with Disabilities Act to help our public culture accept and welcome chil-
dren with serious illnesses or disabilities.
V. Conclusion
We can only wonder what Eilish Holton thought of the Hensel twins.
Eilish remained silent throughout her visit and merely stared.183 Surgically
re-engineered to better approximate the norm of individual autonomy, Eil-
ish Holton may have glimpsed in the Hensel twins "what might have been."
Our jurisprudence continues to struggle with treatment decisions for seri-
ously ill and disabled children and faces the more recent challenge of
regulating parents' attempts to engineer their offspring genetically. The
medical and scientific technologies creating these treatment dilemmas offer
the possibilities of eventually eliminating genetic and congenital abnor-
malities. Before we legally or morally support such treatment plans, how-
ever, we should consider what we lose when we eliminate the disabled or
"differently abled." I hope we will not as a society wonder, as Eilish may
have, what human interdependence might have been.
183. See 20/20: Divided by Love, supra note 122.
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